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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
0. K. CLAY, Administrator of the 
estate of ARNOLD KARTCHNER, 
also known as ARNOLD G. KART-
CHNER, also known as ARNOLD 
GRANT KARTCHNER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
STEPHEN L. DUNFORD, PAUL H. 
STEVENS, BURNS L. DUNFORD 
and L. CLAYTON DUNFORD, 
doing business as THE DUNFORD 
BREAD COMPANY, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 7705 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF TO 
RESPONDENTS' PETITION FOR REHEARING 
-· JOE P. BOSONE, 
F I L ~ ~ A. H. HOUGAARD, 
. ...., Attorneys for Plaintiff 
MAl< 2 G 195~ and Appellant, 
405 Felt Building, 
---ck;k~-5-~~-;;;~-c~~~~·-u~~----· Salt Lake City, utah. 
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IN THE SUPREME C.QURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
0. K. CLAY, Administrator of the 
estate of ARNOLD KARTCHNER, 
also known as ARNOLD G. KART-
CHNER, also known as ARNOLD 
GRANT KARTCHNER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
STEPHEN L. DUNFORD, PAUL H. 
STEVENS, BURNS L. DUNFORD 
and L. CLAYTON DUNFORD, 
doing business as THE DUNFORD 
BREAD CO:MP ANY, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
7705 
, APPELiu\NT'S REPLY BRIEF TO 
RESPONDENTS' PETITION FOR REHEARING 
RESPONDENTS' POINT I. 
THIS COURT FAILED TO PASS UPON AND DETER-
MINE ALL QUESTIONS OF LAW INVOLVED IN THE CASE 
PRESENTED UPON THE APPEAL AND NECESSARY TO 
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THE FINAL DETERMINATION OF THE CASE, CONTRARY 
TO THE PROVISIONS OF RULE 76(a) U.R.C.P. 
The respondents assert that this court has failed to 
pass upon and determine all of the questions of law 
involved in this case. 
It is our understanding that the court is not required 
to pass upon all of the questions raised on appeal where, 
as in this case, reversible error is found by a considera-
tion of one or more points presented by the appeal. 
It was so held in the case of Wright v. Southern Pacific 
Company, 15 Utah 421, 49 Pacific 309, where it was said 
that it was not usual or necessary for the Supreme Court 
to pass- upon each and every question raised on an appeal 
when the case is reversed. It is sufficient to pass upon 
and determine such questions raised upon the appeal as 
were necessary to the final determination of the case, 
and this has been done in this case. 
RESPONDENTS' POINT II. 
THIS HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
THE INSTRUCTION ON ASSUMPTION OF RISK WAS 
PREJUDICIAL ERROR. 
The court in its opinion has determined that Instruc-
tion No. 7 was reversible error; that by this instruction, 
the jury could have arrived at its verdict e·ven though 
it may have concluded that the defendant was negligent, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
and the deceased was not guilty of contributory negli-
gence (Opinion, Page :2). It further deter1nined, "Apply-
ing the aboYe principles to the facts of this case, we are 
ronvinced the only proper instructions here are those 
relating to neg-ligence and contributory negligence." 
It was also detern1ined in the concurring opinion of 
Chief Justice \Volfe that Instruction No. 7 did not fit 
the facts of this case, and that in the great majority of 
negligence cases an instruction upon the effect of plain-
tiff's contributory negligence will cover all that need be 
said to the jury in a case involving alleged negligence, 
and that one does not assume the risks of danger which 
he has no reason to anticipate; that an analysis of the 
decisions and cited authorities in the brief leads to the 
conclusion that counsel invites error by requesting an 
instruction on assumption of risk unless certain condi-
-· tions referred to in the opinion exist. 
The respondents now admit that there was e-rror in 
Instruction K o. 7, but contend that such error did not 
result in prejudice to the appellant. To so argue is to 
attempt now to examine the minds of the jurors in arriv-
ing at a verdict. If the instruction was wrong, as held 
by this court, it would seen1 certain that there was pre-
judice resulting to the appellant. Fron1 that instruction, 
the jury might well assume that appellant in alighting 
from his auton1obile did incur an obvious risk of personal 
injury. The court has determined by its opinion that 
the uncontroverted evidence shows that at the time of 
the accident, the deceased was standing on the shoulder 
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of the highway where vehicles ordinarily do not travel 
and in a place that was not so palpably dangerous that 
deceased could be considered to have assumed the risk. 
The driver of respondents' truck admitted that his 
speed immediately before the truck struck the· deceased 
was 20 miles per hour, which would be 30 feet per second. 
The distance from an extended curbline on 3rd East 
Street to the point of accident is 167 feet, so that the 
element of time involved from the time the truck left the 
intersection of 13th South and 3rd F_Jast Street until it 
struck the deceased was 5¥2 seconds. In fact, in comput-
ing the time that the deceased would be engaged in open-
ing the door of his station wagon, alighting therefrom, 
conversing with the little boy, closing the door and hav-
ing stood there approximately one second as testified to 
by the eye-witness driving west on said 13th South 
Street, it would probably take fron1 seven to ten seconds 
at least, and if such were the case, the· respondents' truck 
would definitely not be in view of the deceased at the 
time he commenced to alight. vVe subn1it, as a matter of 
law, that the deceased had a right to assume that any 
motor vehicle proceeding easterly on 13th South would 
not leave the main traveled portion of the highway and 
follow a course which would cause the truck to- strike 
some portion of the deceased's automobile under all of 
the existing circumstances. Instruction No. 7, admittedly 
in error, would necessarily be prejudicial to the rights 
of the appellant. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
The respondent8 contend that the court's ln~truc­
tion K o. 10, complained of by appellant ·on this appeal, 
is a correct state-ment of law. 1'he appellant urged on 
appeal that thi8 instruction wa:; erroneous and prejudi-
cial. \Y e are ~till of the opinion that Instruction No. 10 
is in error, but the court, having found reversible error 
in the giving of Instruction No. 7, found no necessity 
for passing upon Instruction No. 10. If there appears 
sufficient reason to modify the decision of the court, we 
think such n1odification should be lirni ted to a considera-
tion of Instruction No. 10. The error of this instruction 
is argued in the Appellant's Brief at Page 28, and the 
instruction is there set forth in full. The instruction is 
certainly more favorable to the respondent than the evi-
dence warrants. Instead of using the criterion of ordi-
nary or reasonable care, it adopts the criterion of vigi-
lance. Not only does it adopt this criterion as to the 
duty of deceased, but it adopts the rule of vigilance for 
the purpose of discovering perils by which he Inay be 
menaced and their avoidance after they are aseerta.ined. 
\V e submit that the evidence in this case does not 
permit of any finding that the deceased failed to use 
ordinary care to save hhnself frorn injury by the negli-
gent act of the driver of respondents' truck. rrhe-re would 
seem to be no good reason in so far as disclosed by any 
fact in this case to depart from the standard rule of 
reasonable and oi·dinary care. Nor is there any justifi-
cation to en1phasize such duty of care· on the part of the 
deceased. This is especially true when this instruction 
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1s viewed in the light of the evdence as to what the· 
deceased did or failed to do at the time and place of 
the accident in question. Again, Paragraph 2 of the 
instruction is in error in that it again emphasizes the 
necessity for the deceased to exercise vigilance to dis-
cover the approach of traffic and to particularly discover 
the truck being then and there operated by M ontell 
Magnum. By this instruction, as well as by Instruction 
No. 7, the appellant is deprived of the rule of law which 
gave to the deceased the right to assume that other per-
sons operating vehicles upon the highway would conform 
to traffic rules and regulations. There was ample room 
for all motor vehicles to pass the point where the de-
ceased's truck was parked and certainly he should not 
be charged with any higher degree than ordinary care 
in observing the approach of traffic, and especially such 
traffic as was moving along the highway in a manner 
different to the ordinary use of the highway, especially 
so in view of the time element involved. 
It seems remarkable to the writers of this brief 
that respondents so glibly use expressions to the effect 
that the deceased placed himself in a position of obvious 
peril in the light of the clear and undisputed facts as 
disclosed by the evidence. 
RESPONDENTS' POINTS III. AND IV. 
THIS HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
HOLD THAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD 
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TO WARRANT A FINDING THAT ANY NEGLIGENCE 
UPON THE PART OF THE DEFENDANT'S DRIVER WAS 
THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT. 
THIS HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
HOLD THAT THE DECEASED WAS GUILTY OF CON-
TRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW BAR-
RING ANY RECOVERY IN THIS ACTION. 
Respondent claims in its argmnent under Point III. 
that the court erred in failing to hold that there was no 
evidence which would have justified a finding of negli-
gence on the part of the defendants' driver, and under 
Point IV., urges substantially the san1e grounds in that 
the court erred in failing to hold that the deceased was 
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. 
In addition to what we have said concerning the ques-
tions of determining every issue presented by either the 
appellant or the respondents, may we further say that 
we do not believe that a cross-appeal was ever perfected 
from the judgment of the lower court as contemplated 
by the provisions of Rule 74 (b) and Rule 75 (d) U.H.C.P., 
The only step taken by counsel to perfect a cross-appeal 
is the statement in Respondents' Brief (Page· 25, Point 
5), that the court erred in refusing to grant defendants' 
motion for a directed verdict. By Rule 75 (b), it is 
provided that where any one or more· parties have 
appealed as required by Rule 73, other parties 1nay cross-
appeal from the order or judgment of the lower court 
without filing a notice of appeal, provided, however, such 
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party or parties shall file a statement of the points on 
which he intends to rely upon such cross-appeal within 
the time as required by Subdivision (d) of Rule 75. 
Referring to Rule 75 (d), it will be observed that if the 
respondent desires to cross-appeal, or if the appellant 
has filed a statement of the points on which he intends 
· to rely and the respondent desires to have the appellate 
court consider other or additional matters, the respon-
dent shall within ten days after the service and filing 
of appellant's designation serve and file a statement of 
respondent's points either by way of such cross-appeal 
or for the purpose of having considered other or addi-
tional matters than those raised by appellant. It will 
also be observed from Rule 75 (g), that the clerk is 
required to prepare the record on appeal which must 
include the designations or stipulations of the parties 
as to matters to be included in the record and any state-
Inent by the appellant or the respondent of the points 
on which said parties intend to rely. 
It seems illogical upon an appeal by a plaintiff or 
defendant that the respondent for the first time and 
without taking any action of any kind to perfect his 
cross-appeal, should be entitled to have all other points 
reviewed by merely calling attention to such claimed 
errors in his reply brief. 
Assuming that a cross-appeal may be perfected in 
the manner respondent has followed it, it would still be 
clear from the opinion of the court that Points 3 and .f 
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have been fully and correctly detennined. At Page 3 of 
the opinion, the court says, "We are convinced that the 
only proper instructions here were those relating to 
negligence and contributory negligence. Again at Page 
2 of the opinion, "lVIost of them (referring to the cases 
cited by respondents) relate to case·s where a pedestrian 
leaves a place of safety and suddenly walks into the 
path of 1noving traffic on regularly traveled portions of 
the highway, and none is analogous to this case." 
\Ye have again exmnined smne of the cases cited by 
respondents where a person has alighted fron1 a stand-
ing vehicle and 1noved into a position of danger. In these 
cases, the pedestrian alighted from a standing vehicle 
and suddenly n1oved into the path of approaching traffic, 
which involved a situation entirely different frmn the 
facts in the case at bar, and none of them fit the facts 
as shown by the evidence in this case. 
In the Peterson Case citedin Respondents' Brief on 
Petition for Rehearing, Page 11-12, the court specifically 
points out that, "She either. ran in front or in back of 
the car that was parked * * * and as the· child darted 
out from in front or in back of the parked car, he had 
no opportunity of seeing her." Similarly in the Goff 
Case cited at page 19 of Respondents' Brief, the court 
says, "We have never departed fron1 the rule stated in 
Harris 'US. Commercial Ice Company, (Citations), that 
one who steps into a busy street and is immediately 
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struck by a passing vehicle which he could have seen had 
he looked cannot recover." There is no analogy whatever 
in any of the cases cited hy respondents to the facts in 
the case at bar. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOE P. BOSONE, 
A. H. HOUGAARD, 
Attorneys for Appellant, 
405 Felt Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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